Sunday, February 24, 2008

Seeking New Semantic Clarity and Evolutionary Development in The Area of 'Epistemollgical Idealism' -- The Pursuit of Truth (Part 1)

There are a few different things I want to accomplish in this essay. Firstly, I wish to differentiate between different types of idealism such as ethical idealism, political idealism, aesthetic idealism, and epistemological idealism.

Secondly, I wish to show how there is a switch in the meaning -- a 'semantical switch' -- of the term-concept of 'idealism' when we start to talk about 'epistemological idealism'. This is not a good thing as it tends to create confusion between what the general public usually means by the term-concept of 'idealism' and what philosophy academics generally mean by it. It is confusing also for beginning philosophy students because they generally have a layperson's idea of what the term-concept of 'idealism' means stamped in their mind-brain, only to find out that in philosophy circles it generally means something quite different.

Thirdly, the switch in meaning of the term-concept of idealism in epistemological circles (i.e., pertaining to what is knowledge0-and in ontological circles (pertaining to what 'really exists') tends to undermine, sabotage, and marginalize the first, layperson's more pragmatic concept of what the term-concept of idealism means. My goal in this essay then, is to sort through all of this potential and/or actual semantic confusion and bring more clarity to thw whole subject matter. One might say that I am trying to bring more 'semantic idealism' to an area of philosophy where there is room for significant smenatic confusion and misunderstanding.

Let us go back to point one. If I say that I am writing on the subject of 'ethical idealism', it is probably fairly clear to most educated people -- laypersons and philosophy academics alike -- what I am wriing about. I am writing about my idea of a 'perfect ethical system'. Same with the subject of 'political idealism' -- here it is likely that I am writing about my idea of a perfect political system. Same with 'aesthetic idealism' -- writing about perfect beauty, 'economic idealism' -- writing about 'perfect economics', 'legal idealism' -- writing about perfect law...and so on. In all of these cases, it seems like we could simply substitute the word-idea of 'perfect' for 'idealism' and we have a pretty good working defiintion of what 'idealism' means.

We could alos contrast the idea of 'idealism' with 'realism' -- idealism pertaining to that which is perfect but not real, and realism pertaining to that which is not ideal but which exists in reality -- and you have a further clarification of what the term-concept of 'idealism' means.

Now let us move a little closer to our problem area of semantic confusion. If I say I am writing on the subject of 'semantic idealism', we could say that I am writing about 'perfect meaning or semantics' -- and/or a system-process I have devised and/or partly borrrowed from someone else in order to aim to get closer to the ideal of 'perfect semantic clarity'.

Now still closer to our semantic problem within the field of philosophy. If I say that I am writing on the subject of 'epistemological idealism', it makes perfect sense -- based on everything we have said about the term-concept of 'idealism' so far -- to believe that what I have in mind is to either write about a 'perfect or idealistic epistemological system (of knowledge) -- and/or to write about a process/means by which to aim for and/or achieve a more idealistic (closer to perfect) epistemological system (of knowledge).

However, this is where we come to a huge semantic and epistemological roadblock because, all of a sudden, in philosophical circles, the meaning of the term-concept of 'epistemelogical (and ontological) idealism' does a bi-polar 180 degree switch. All of a sudden the ideal becomes the 'real' as well as the ideal. Reality is no longer reality -- rather, it is a 'false illusion'. So where did the 'real' disappear to? Well, philosophers are still scratiching their heads on that one. Ask Parmenides and Plato -- which of course we can't anymore because they are both long, long dead -- on this one because they seem to have been the main two trumpeters and propogaters of this semantic and epistemological quagmire relative to what is 'real' vs. what is not.

If I could go back in a time machine and interview the esteemed Mr. Plato, here is something close to what I would say: 'Mr. Plato, with all due respect, I'm not sure whether you have been looking up at the sky too much, whether you have been munching on too many poppy seeds or something else with hallucinatory effects that no one today knows about, and/or whether you were simply brainwashed by Mr. Parmenides, one of your esteemed philosophical mentors -- but don't try to tell me that if I am standing right in front of you, looking at you eyeball to eyeball, and/or if I reach out to shake your hand and say that you did some wonderful things for philosophy -- don't try to tell me that the person I am looking at and/or touching doesnt' really exist, or is just an 'illusion' or a 'carbon copy' or a 'shadow' of someone somewhere else in 'Never, Never Land' where only you and Paremides seem to know where this supposedly real 'Never, Never Land' exists -- don't try to tell me, and sell me on, any of this 'epistemological smoke and mirrors' because if you do, then I will say to you -- again with all due respect -- get your head out of the clouds and re-ground your legs on this earth. Mr. Parmenides has poisoned you. He brainwashed you. You are confusing the ideal with the real. This is epistemological treason. In the words of Gestalt Therapy, Mr. Plato, "Get out of your head and come to your senses." In the words of Mr. Sartre, "Existence precedes essence." At best, you put the cart before the horse (idealism before realism instead of the other way around. At worst, you created an epistemological-ontological-metaphysical world that didn't/doesn't exist. Again, Mr. Plato, you created epistemological treason by marginalizing your senses rather than honoring them. This was your Achilles heel. This was your 'Plato's heel' -- the place where you failed your fellow philosopher by not being properly grounded on earth and by not providing a good role model for all epistemologists and ontologists who followed you. Your biggest weakness as a philosopher was that you passed on 'Parmenides Poison' for anyone naive enough and epistemologically submissive enough to take a big gulp of the poisonous concoction that you and Parmenides were offering up to the rest of the world. Mr. Plato, you created much of the foundation for the study of modern philosophy. You are still looked upon as the the 'ultimate philosophical idealist' -- and that is in a good way, not the bad way that I am specifying here.'

However, philosophy is not all about heaping accolades on our 'hall of fame' philosophers. Ultimately, it is about the pursuit of truth -- at least within the boundaries of epistemology. And in this regard, sometimes a philosopher has to bring out his or her 'Nietzxshean hammer' to get to the bottom of truth, and to dispose of all epistemological toxins, poisons -- and nonsense -- that may be blocking the way to truth.

In this regard also, it is long past time to take these old ideas of epistemological idealism -- particularly Plato -- and take them off of their philosophical semantic and teaching pedestal. Teach them -- yes -- but don't continue to carry them around as if they are the be all and end all of what 'epistemological idealism' means.

New semantic distinctions are necessary here. The names and distinctions may seem partly bizarre, partly funny, partly semantically confusing in their own right but they are logically necessary due to the fact that we have at least two significantly different meanings of the term-concept 'idealism' kicking around in discussions of the same overall subject matter -- epistemology. (There are even different 'sub-meanings' within these two significant different meanings of idealism that also need to be distinguished from each other but we will save these distinctions for a different essay.)

Until I or someone else can propose better name-distinctions, the name-distinctios I will use are these;

1. Idealistic (meanng 'other world') epistemological idealism (meaning the pursuit of epistemological perfection)-- This is the pursuit of perfect, idealistic truth (redundancies, yes, I know) in 'other worlds' other than the empirical, physical world around us (egs. Parmenides, Plato, Berkely);
2. Rational epistemology -- This is the pursuit of truth in logic and reason only(including mathematics, and/or geometry without an empirical-sensory foundation (egs. Descartes, Spinoza)
3. Empirical epistemological idealism -- This is the pursuit of truth through sensory observation only; what is 'real' is only that which can be seen and/or otherwise experienced through our senses (egs. Locke, Berkely, Hume)
4. Dialectical epistemological idealism -- This type of epistemological idealism combines different elements of different epistemological categories together and/or 'marries' bi-polar epistemological categories together such as 'rational-empiricism' and/or 'thesis-anti-thesis' and/or 'constructive-deconstructionism'.
a) Sensory-rational-empirical epistemological idealism (egs. Aristotle, Bacon, Darwin, Korzybski, Hawakawa);
b) Integrative epistemological idealism -- thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis (eg. Hegel) constructive-deconstructionism -- getting rid of 'epistemological toxins, poisons, smoke and mirrors', etc. (egs. Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida)

Now none of these distinctions are perfectly clean or completely separated from each other. Things in the real world are rarely perfectly distinguishable from each other.

Things become even less clean when you try to sort each philosopher -- each epistemologist -- into one category or another. Again reality rarely gives us 'pure, isolated, perfectly distinguishable' categories. Complications arise such as with Berkely who was both an epistemological idealist in the Paramedean and Platonic sense of the word 'idealist' as well as an epistemological empiricist in the Lockean and Humean sense of the word 'empiricist'. More on these complications in a later essay.

Some of these distinctions -- such as between 'idealism', 'rationalism' and 'empiricism' -- have been around in philosophy for a long time. These are not new distinctions. They are used in most introductory philosophy texts.

The additional involvement of 'dialectic thinking' in epistemology goes back mainly to Hegel with earlier dialectical or partly dialectical philosophers like Anaxamander, Heraclitus, the Han Philosophers, Kant, and Fichte setting the stage for the birth of Hegelian Dialectical Idealism (in the sense of the epistemological pursuit of perfection or 'Absolute Truth').

What is important here is two things: first, that every distinction mentioned above can be viewed as a different epistemological path taken up by different philosophers in their individucal quests for Epistemological Truth and Perfection; and second, that some paths are qualitatively better than others -- that is why we like to call what we are doing here 'epistemological evolution'.

So for example, from an epistemological point of view, kiss Parmendides and Plato goodbye. They hold no place in modern epistemology. It makes no sense to chase epistemology/ontology and the pursuit of Truth/Existence into some phantom world that we can neither see nor touch because if we do this then epistemology and the pursuit of truth loses all meaning and credibility. There is a reason why 'eye witness' testimony is the foundation of most democratic systems of justice -- as long as the witness is credible and doesn't have a narcissistic motivation to lie, and as long as we believe the witness was not mistaken in what they saw, then this is generally considered to be the 'firmest epistemological grounds that we have to stand on in our pursuit of truth'; DNA has more recently become a foundation for most democratic systems of justice and here again the evidence is 'physical', 'observational', and 'empirical'. There is no one who can logically dispute this type of physical evidence unless it is tampered with and/or corrupted.
I would argue that 'rational-empiricism' either is -- or should be -- the epistemological heart of all democratic justice systems, and the biggest deterrent to this type of justice system is human narcissism -- and particularly -- money and power.

One of the best things that I believe Hegel ever wrote -- and it pains me but I cannot find the exact quote right now to put me on firmer epistemological grounds -- but what I remember goes something like this: Every theory carries within it the seeds of its own self-destruction. (The same can be said about life incidently: life carries within it the seeds to its own self-destruciton -- aging and death. This almost sounds like Freud's 'death instinct'. More on this controversial idea at a probably much later date.)

And so it was with both rationalism and empiricism. Both had their respective day on the pedestal of human value and both collapsed under the lop-sided weight of their respective one-sided extremism. In the end, they both needed each other, like Romeo and Juliet, to unite each other's bi-polar chemistries, and to complement each other's weaknesses. Bi-polarity -- indeed, multiple bi-polarity -- is the essence of life, and what's good for life is also good for epistemology. Epistemology -- ideally speaking -- follows life, and epistemology -- ideally speaking -- works like life. Epistemology functions better dialectically. Rationalism needs empiricism and empiricism needs rationalism. Thesis needs anti-thesis and anti-thesis needs thesis. Constructionism needs deconstructionism and deconstructionism needs constructionism. Realism needs idealism and idealism needs realism. Whenever one bi-polar partner gets too far away from the other, bad things start to happen. Homeostatic balance is lost. The pathology of one-sided extremism starts to set in. Self-destruction is just around the corner.

And on that note we will end our little essay-lecture on epistemology for today. If you have followed me this far, then you like I, probably need a break. Too much epistemology all at one time can also unsettle homestatic balance. Life is about resolving one homeostatic imbalance only to stir up another. I learned this principle first and foremost from reading Fritz Perls, the main founder of Gestalt Therapy. He called it 'organismic self-regulation'. (Yes, even 'orgasmic self-reglulation is part of the larger process. Woke you up perhaps!)

To summarize this final connection and perhaps leave you something extra to think about, I will re-state one final philosophical principle that is the product of this essay: specifically, you cannot separate the study of epistemology from the study of homeostatic balance -- and the bridge between them is the 'dialectic' and/or 'multi-dialectic'. The path to truth and homeostatic balance -- as with everything else in life, not just epistemology and the pursuit of Truth, Democracy, and Justice but also the pursuit of Existence, Being and Becoming -- is the path of dialectic exchange and interchange. Worded otherwise, the path of dialectic, democratic, passionate encounter.

This sounds like a combination of Hegel, The Enlightenment, Romanticism, Existentialism, and Gestalt Therapy all rolled into one. Yep! That's my intentions.

Enough for today!

dgb, Feb. 25th, 2008

Saturday, February 16, 2008

Foundations and Distinctions for a DGB Post-Hegelian Epistemology (Part 2): The Truth Shall Set You Free

Epistemology is like the wheels of a plane. You have to be grounded -- have good contact with the ground -- before you can fly. Otherwise, you won't likely return safely.

A philosopher has to be properly grounded before he or she can fly. In this regard, I am not only talking about the philosophers who call themselves philosophers. I am talking about all of us. Because like it or not -- formally or informally, overtly or covertly, academically or practically -- we are all philosophers. We all have to come up with some sort of understanding of ourselves and the world we live in, what is good and what is bad, what is right and what is wrong, what is real and what is ideal, and how we should proceed in the world -- what type of choices we should make, and/or want to make, and whether these choices should be 'either/or' choices that demand that we choose one item/action or the other, whehter they should be 'integrative' choices that aim to work two sides of a 'bi-polarity-continuum' towards the middle ('splitting the difference', or 'making a compromise'), or finally aiming to make 'double ended choices' (working both ends of the polarity continuum at their respective ends or worded otherwise, in effect, aiming to 'have your cake and eat it too'. In some areas this last type of philosophy might not be viewed as a 'philosophy with integrity' and may be called 'cheating' or 'collusion' or 'conflict of interest', particularily if and when it is done covertly, naricsisitically, manipulatively, underhandedly).

So again -- whether we like it or not -- we are all philosophers.

And all philosophy starts with epistemology. We have to be properly grounded before we can fly. We have to observe before we reason. We have to know what is real before we search for the ideal. Existence before essense -- I thing Sartre said that. Being before becoming -- I think Fritz Perls and many of the other Gestaltist therapists have said that. Realism before idealism -- if nobody has said that before me, then I said that. Same with Epistemology before Ethics. And Observation before Reason. I would even say Philosophy before Science and Science before Spirituality and Religion. You have to be properly grounded and be able to crawl, walk and then run before you can fly.

Many philosophers have argued that you cannot connect epistemology (what is) to ethics (what should be). I disagree with that. You look at the world around you, what is happening in it, how things work, how things function -- before man's narcissistic and/or ethical intrusion into it -- and you can see a number of different but related things: that things are linked to each other, that some things are attracted to each other and connect with each other, while other things reject each other and eitheer separate and/or compete with each other. You see that there is life and death, living and dying, growth and decay. You see that the world is full of 'opposites' -- plus and minuses, hot and cold, wet and dry, water and fire, earth and sky, males and females, attraction and rejection, union and separation, alkaline and acidic, too much and too little...You see that the world is precariously balanced and that things that affect others affect you. Things that affect your brother or sister affect you, things that affect your father or mother affect you, things that affect your community can affect you, things that are passed in law affect you, things that happen in the economy affect you, that your positive and negative experiences affect you, things that happen in your environment affect you, things that happen half way around the world affect you, or can affect you....

It is impossible to understand the world properly and ourselves properly without understanding the principle of 'homeostatic balance'. (See W.B. Cannon's 'The Wisdom of the Body', 1932). The meeting ground of epistemology and ethics is the principle of homeostatic balance.

You cannot talk about either epistemology or ethics without talking about the principle of homestatic balance. Many of our earliest philosophers -- West and East -- saw that: Anaximander, Heraclitus, Plato to some extent, Confuscius, the Han Philosophers ('yin', 'yang'...). Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Shelling, and Marx saw that at least in some partial realistic-idealistic capacity in their respective ideological developments of the 'dialectic' ...Nietzsche saw that (especially in his first book, 'The Birth of Tragedy')...Freud saw that (the 'id' vs. the 'superego'), Jung saw that (the 'persona' vs. the 'shadow'), Perls saw that (the 'topdog' vs. the 'underdog'), Cannon saw that in 'The Wisdom of the Body'...Erich Fromm saw that as articulated in two of his many books: 'Man For Himself' (1947) and 'The Sane Society' (1955).

There are some epistemological philosophers -- indeed, some of our most famous and cherished philosophers -- who tried to epistemologically fly before they could crawl, walk, and run. Parmenides and Plato are two of the guiltiest culprits in this regard. Descartes and Spinoza -- as much as I like Spinoza -- were not far behind. Any philosopher who tried to 'reason' without 'observing with the senses' first was putting the cart before the horse. We call these types of epistemologists 'idealistic epistemologists' (Parmenides, Plato...) or 'Rationalists' (Descartes, Spinoza...). These are the epistemologists who tried to fly before they could crawl, walk, or run. They tried to 'bipass sensory observation'. Their main argument was that sensory observation was flawed -- thus, the rationale for 'bipassing' it and trying to use 'logic and reason' alone to get to an 'idealistic' or 'rational' epistemology. Big mistake. It was a recipe for epistelogical pathology and disaster waiting to happen. (Parmenides was Plato's pathological influence in the realm of epistemology -- and the consequence was Plato's theory of 'Ideal Forms'.)

Aristotle went a long way towards compenating for, and correcting, the epistemological pathologies and disasters of Parmenides and Plato. Aristotle was more like the Pre-Socratics (Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus...but not Parmenides) in that he started with sensory observation, and then moved up the 'latter of abstraction' to 'reason and logic', 'causes', 'universals', and 'ethics'. In contrast, Plato 'philosophized from the sky' without having any 'epistemological roots and/or wheels on the ground. This was Plato's biggest weakness as a philosopher -- and particularly as an epistemologist. Epistemology needs to be emprically based on sensory observation before reason and logic. Plato dismissed sensory observation -- and in effect, physics and biology -- and this was his greatest undoing as a philosophy. Plato -- at least in terms of his philosophy -- was a man who was alienated from the physical world around him, and/or dismissed the world around him for its imperfections. And this in turn caused the greatest imperfections in his philosophy. A man or woman alienated from the biology and physics of the earth is a man or woman alienated from the biology and physics of him or herself. And this in turn will affect -- adversely at least to my way of thinking -- the person's psychology, spirituality, and soul. Both epistemologically and ethically speaking, there needs to be a dialectic (mutual) influence between biology and physics on the one hand and psychology, philosphy, politics, law, econimics, art and culture...on the other hand. Either extreme -- idealism without realism or realism without idealism, or biology and physics without philosophy and psychology or philosophy and psychology without biology and physics, or spirituality and religion without science or science without spirituality and religion, or self-assertion without social sensitivity or social sensitivity without self-assertion -- will create a one-sided extremist philosophical pathology headed for self-destruction.

The truth shall set you free. The truth is balance and balance is the truth. Biologically speaking. Phsycially speaking. Philosophically speaking. Psychologically speaking. Medically speaking. Politically speaking. Economically speaking. Legally speaking. Relgiously speaking. Epistemologically speaking. Ethically speaking.

The truth is balance and balance is the truth. Many others -- more intelligent thann me -- have said this in similar and/or different ways. I am just summarizing 2700 years of both Western and Eastern philosophy. This is the goal of DGB Post-Hegelian Philosophy. Hegel said that 'The real is the rational and the rational is the real.' I don't entirely agree with this assertion. Man's rationality -- and particularity the 'rationality of balance' -- can be easily corrupted and pathologized by his one-sided longing for narcissistic extremism (sex, violence, righteousness, egotism, selfishness, greed, covert manipulation and collusion...). But in the end, narcissistic extremism usually ends in self-destruction.

Which brings us back to either God's and/or Science's Ultimate Truth: The truth is balance and balance is the truth. And this truth shall set you free.

dgb, Feb. 16th, 2008.

Sunday, February 10, 2008

Foundations and Distinctions For A DGB Post-Hegelian Approach to the Study of Epistemology (Part 1)

Finding Truth: Foundations and Distinctions for a DGB, Post-Hegelian View Of Epistemology (Part 1)

In order to determine where the study of epistemology 'fits' into the study of philosophy, we need to 'go up and down the abstraction ladder' - up to determine what lies 'above' the study of epistemology, and 'down' to determine what lies 'below' and/or 'within' the study of epistemology.

To do this, I wound up asking myself a question that may or may not seem quite separate from the study of epistemology, but which is definitely related: specifically, 'What are some of the main different elements of mind-brain function?' Before I take this argument any further, I would like to demonstrate some of the logistics behind 'dialectical reasoning' and the use of many 'hyphenated words' where a single word is generally the standard language norm in such instances probably because it is generally much easier for standard communication purposes.

Whereas standard practise might dictate the use of the term 'brain' or in another instance the term 'mind', a 'dialectical philosopher' might instead choose to use the term 'mind-brain' as a substitute for both. A 'multi-dialectic-philosopher' might even use the term 'mind-brain-self' or 'mind-brain-psyche' or 'mind-brain-soul'. The emphasis here is on the 'mutual exchange of influence and causality', either two-fold, three-fold, or even many-fold. This can potentially make a mess of communication but at the same time it does, or can, help people to think more 'wholistically' and 'integratively' as opposed to 'reductionistically'. Consequently, my use of many hypenated (dialectical) words such as 'term-concepts' and 'mind-brain'.

Is the physiology of our brain totally disconnected and separate from the psychology and/or philosophy of our mind? Or does everything come in 'one big multi-dialectical-integrative package' which, as humans, we tend to too easily separate conceptually even though they may not be separated phenomenally. We compartmentalize, classify, and define phenomena into 'conceptual pieces' because this makes it easier to think and talk about them. But life is not only about the 'pieces'. Life is also very much about how the different pieces all come together into one great big functional, multi-dialectical-integrative package.

The pieces support the whole and the whole supports the pieces. And talking about the pieces without talking about the whole - and how the whole is precariously and homeostatically balanced together by the way the pieces come together in just the right amounts to make up the proper functioning of the whole - is one of the most dangerous things that we Westerners continue to do in our every day thinking - from science and medicine to business and economics to philosophy and psychology to politics and law to spirituality and religion... This is the main purpose of Hegel's Hotel and DGB Philosophy-Psychology-Politics-Business-Science-Medicine...to show how everything is connected, to show how everything is dialectically connected, and indeed to show how everything is multi-dialectically connected.

Now, back to my main argument relative to the interconnection between 'mind-brain function' and epistemology (the search for knowledge and truth), as well as the conception that just as the study of philosophy is generally viewed as being a more 'abstract' realm of study than the study of epistemology (the former encompassing the latter as well as other areas of study such as the foundations and assumptions of ethics, law, politics, art, science and medicine, religion, and more) - so too, the study of 'mind-brain function' can be viewed as a more abstract study than both (since it encompasses all of philosophy as well as elements of psychology, biology, physics, chemistry, and potentially still more...)

So let us look briefly at the potential study of 'mind-brain function' at least from a 'philosophical-psychological-biological-evolutionary' point of view.

What is the main function of the mind-brain? How about this? Problem-solving. If we accept this assumption as to the mind-brain's function, then every 'sub-function' of the mind-brain can be said to be 'wholistically and reductionistically in the service of problem-solving'. From this philosophical assumption, the mind-brain can be divided and sub-divided into more and more sub-functions - all supportive of, and inter-connected relative to, the overall goal of 'problem-solving'.

If we accept the problem-soving function as the main overall function of the mind-brain, then at least two further levels of 'sub-function' can be further differentiated from - but at the same time seen to be interconnected with - each other.

The first realm of mind-brain sub-function can be viewed as having five different sub-functions: 1. perception and cognition (epistemology); 2. conversion (symbolism, language, and meaning); 3. evaluation (narcissism, altruism, morality, ethics, rules, laws...); 4. choice-making and choice of choices (awareness of choices, excitement, fear, freedom vs determinism, use of narcissism, ethics, and/or other evaluation factors vs. genetic and/or social-bioligical-historical conditioning of choices) 5. execution of action (existentialism, ontology (the study of 'being'), behaviorism (the study of manipulating or 'conditioning' of choices through positive and/or negative consequences...)

We can also talk about the mind-brain as having an assortment of second realm sub-functions which are inter-related to each other and to all functions above these sub-functions such as:

1. memory; 2. planning; 3. creativity, visualization; 4. association; 5. differentation or distinction (boundary-making); 6. integration; 7. symbolism and language; 8. classification, categorization, compartmentalization; 9. reasoning, logic, inferences; 10. spatial-judging; 11. time-judging; 12. introjection and identification (copying); 13. projection (seeing ourselves in others); 14. compensation; 15. function-judging; 16. modification.

These subsidiary functions are similar to Kant's 'a priori' categories although I do not agree with all of Kant's arguments and opinions in this regard. It is not the place and the time to get into those arguments and opinions here other than to say that I view these secondary mind-brain functions as being evolutionary survival tools that man brings to the table in his bid both individually and collectively to survive - and to survive well.

In summary, what we have done here is laid out the larger 'mind-brain context' in which man's individual and collective, formal and informal, study of epistemology - and the search for knowledge-truth - takes place.

Epistemology in its reductionist format does not include the study of narcissism, hedonism, egotism, altruism, ethics, justice, laws, etc. Nor does it involve the cognitive-existential act of 'choice-making' - at least as it pertains to 'external behavioral action'. Epistemology does pertain to the act of choice-making relative to the pursuit of knowledge, truth, and 'what is real'. In this pursuit, 'either/or' decisions - or 'choices' - often need to be made, sometimes even life or death choices. Oftentimes too, the best 'epistemological choices' can lie in the 'middle ground' - in the unfolding epistemological play-out between thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis, or speaking metaphorically, in 'Hegel's Hotel' if not always in my particular rendition of Hegel's Hotel but more so in the larger, more all-encompassing, multi-dialectic-pluralistic-evolutionary rendition of Hegel's Hotel.

This version of Hegel's Hotel - and in particular here, this version of DGB's post-Hegelian vision of the study of epistemology, is just a small subset of the much larger world-wide multi-dialectical constantly unfolding epistemological drama. People don't always get the truth right the first time, maybe not even the second or third time, maybe not in time to free an innocent prisoner from a wrong epistemological judgment, maybe not in time to save hundreds of people from a non-properly understood disease or a bad medication that should never have been legalized, but usually somewhere down the line, often after heavy casualties and/or traumacies, people start to get the epistemology right, individually and/or collectively, maybe first as sporadic individuals, gradually gaining more 'social power', and the power of greater and greater accepting numbers - like the growth of the natural health industry in North America - until 'underdog knowledge' finally becomes 'topdog knowledge', reaching the Kingdom of Established Social Truth - until life changes again and/or a 'better and/or more powerful Social Truth' comes along to supplant it. For better or for worse, established Social Truths eventually become accepted as 'Knowledge'. It is the job of the good epistemologist - academically recognized or otherwise - to 'deconstruct' Social Truths that hold more social power than they should, and/or to construct or re-construct Social Truths that have more Realism, 'Subjective-Objectivism', and Integrity on their side than the misplaced, fraudulent, often narcissistically power-based Social Truths that they are replacing.

Let us move on now to a discussion of what lies 'within' the study of epistemology, including a number of distinctions and sub-distinctions that may or may not be partly or fully recognized and/or supported by the 'social powers' and 'status-quo' that be in the world of Academic Western Philosophy. I fully acknowledge some of my technical-academic limitations in the study of advanced epistemology. However, I believe that I more than make up for this limitation in the creativity of my thought, in my ability to 'build epistemological bridges between the 'Constructionists' and the 'Deconstructionists', between the Grand Narrators and the Post-Modernists, between the Structuralists and the Process Thinkers, between the Idealists and the Realists, between the Rationalists and the Empiricists, between the Subjectivists and the Objectivists...That is what Hegel's Hotel is all about - at least within the confines of epistemology and the search for Truth.

dgb, Feb. 10th-11th, 2008.

Sunday, February 03, 2008

The Beginning of Dialectics in Pre-Socratic, Greek Epistemology and Science

'Dialectics' -- at least within the context of Hegel's Hotel -- refers to the battle of opposing ideas (within the context of man's mind and spirit) and whether these opposing ideas come together -- or lend themselves to coming together -- into some sort of integrative compromise; or alternatively, whether they continue to do 'dialectical battle' with each other even thousands of years after their known initial confrontations in the history of man.

We can distinguish between these two types of dialectics respectively with the names of: 1. 'integrative' or 'homeostatic' dialecics; vs. 2. 'will to power, 'righteous, eihter/or', or 'control' dialectics.

It is not unusual for both types of dialectic dynamics to be taking place at essentially the same time as two polar positions collide with each other in the minds and spirits of men and women, and then finally 'reach a truce' with each other in the form of a 'workable, negotiated, integrative compromise' that keeps both sides in the dialectical tussle 'workably happy'. A distinction might also be made in this regard between 'love (attraction, co-operation)' dialectics and 'war' (repulsion, competition, hate) dialectics.

The dynamics and evolution of dialectic philosophy was probably most clearly articulated by the philosopher who is also probably (or arguably at least) the philosopher who is most easily connected to the birth of its name -- G.W.Hegel. A strong, technical case could be made for the spirit and essence of the dialectic having arisen earlier out of the work of Kant (The Critique of Pure Reason) and Fichte who was strongly influenced by Kant. Also, Marx turned Hegel's 'rathional-idealistic' philosophy on its head and delivered stinging critiques of Capitalism -- to inspire, ignite, and/or instigate the growth of revolution, socialism, communism, and huge philo-socio-political-economic change in the Eastern world using dialectic philosophy as his main weapon of offense and defense.

However, the history and the birth of the dialectic goes back much further than even Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Marx. It goes right back to the birth of philosophy -- in both the Western (predominantly Greek) and Eastern (primarily Chinese) world. I want to take a little time here to trace some of the beginnings and the foundations of dialectic philosophy in Pre-Socratic, Greek philosophy in particular, with a small bit of attention also being brought to similar development in the birth of Chinese philosophy. These evolutionary developments in both ancient Greece and China can still be seen, felt, and heard in current Western and Eastern philosophy (epistemology, metaphysic, ethics...), science, medicine, politics, law, and culture in general. So it is certainly worth taking a good look at some of these ancient philosophical developments as an ongoing source of inspiration, creativity, and philosophical evolution today.

If you go back to the first acknowledged and decently known Western (Greek) philosopher -- Thales (624BC-546BC) -- you will see that he was the first known 'philosopher' to stop looking for 'causes amongst the Gods' and to start looking for more 'natural, scientific causes' of what created the world and made it the way it was. Thales was a 'monist' -- a one-cause theorist -- who looked at the source of all life as stemming from 'water'.

If we pass the second oldest Western (Greek) philosopher -- Anaximander (610BC-546BC)for the moment and move to the man who is usually considered the third oldest Western (Greek) philosopher -- Anamimenes (585BC-525BC) -- we see that he too was a monist who took up a counter-position to Thales in arguing that the source of all life stemmed from 'air', not 'water'. Here we have the beginning of a clear, righteous, 'either/or' will-to-power dialectic. Neither of the two philosophers can be viewed as being a dialectic philosopher in his own right -- rather both were monists -- but the articulation of their differences set up the clear dynamics of a 'dialectic struggle for theoretical supremacy) -- no differently than the dialectic debate between Clinton and Obama in their struggle for Democratic Supremacy, or the dialectic debate between McCain and Romney in their struggle for Republican Supremacy (with the additional 'underdog' presence of Paul and Huckabee to make the latter debate a situation that we might label as a 'multi-dialectic debate').