This section focuses on the five areas mentioned in the title: language (words), semantics (meaning), ideas, reality, and epistemology (knowledge) -- and how they all link 'dialectically' and 'wholistically' together.
First up is a short discussion on language. Then we will move quickly into a discussion of semantics -- the relationship of language (or more specifically words) to meaning. From a more complicated brief discussion of meaning, we will then move into a discussion of 'epistemology' -- the study of knowledge. Let's start with the philosophy of language. That is bascially the agenda or menu for this floor of Hegel's Hotel.
First up -- a very brief discussion of language. How many different types of words are there in the English language? Nouns. Verbs. Adjectives. Adverbs. Pronouns. Conjunctions. Prepositions. Introjections. Eight different types of words. Unless I've forgotten one, that is about it.
What are there functions? Nouns. Nouns describe 'structure' in the world -- things that have substance and body, take up space, and don't move very fast -- althouth speed is relative and even things that have 'structure' in the world still move at a /slow, or even a fast pace. A 'cheetah' is the fastest mammal on earth but 'cheetah' is still a noun because a cheetah is considered to have 'structure' and 'substance'. Even 'river' is a noun because it too is considered to have 'structure' and 'substance'. When we start to talk more specifically about 'running' and 'moving' and 'flowing', then we have moved out of the world of 'structure' and now we are talking about the world of 'process' -- verbs describe 'processes' (motion and movement).
Adjectives describe nouns (beautiful girl). Pronouns take the place of nouns (him, her, he, she, it...). Adverbs describe verbs (pretty fast). Conjunctions join nouns or verbs or adjectives or adverbs or clauses together in a sentence (Paul and Sally, fast and slow, faster and faster, He went home and then he went to his bedroom...) You have to excuse me here if I am missing anything. I am going back to my Grade 6 grammar classes and I haven't pulled out a grammar book yet to see if I am missing anything which I'm sure I am because there are hundreds, if not thousands, of exceptions in the English language. So -- I am speaking in generalities here, and I am trying to move fairly quickly here without getting bogged down in exceptions.
Prepositions describe 'relationships' (in, out, of, above, under...). Introjections describe emotions, sounds... (Heh!!, 'Whoosh!!).
So there you have it. That is the English language -- grammatically -- in two or three paragraphs.
Now we come to the subject of 'semantics' or 'meaning'. This gets much, much trickier.
People who believe in the 'one word, one meaning fallacy' are going to get blown away and left behind by the English language. It doesn't matter how many dictionaries you read -- from front to back cover -- you will never completely learn or comprehend the full nature, the intricisies, and the dynamics of the English language if you try to learn the English language from a dictionary. Indeed, this goes for every language -- if you want to learn Parisian French, you have to go to Paris, if you want to learn Quebecois French, you have to go to Quebec. If you want to learn English English, you have to go to England. If you want to learn Canadian English, you have to go to Canada. If you want to learn American English, you have to go to America.
So this brings into focuse the ideas of 'dialect', 'context', and 'function'. Languages for the most part are learned in homes, and on the street, in front of tvs, and in schools, and in places of business. I never learned French properly -- or even adequately -- from a 'French to English translation dictionary'. It just doesn't cut it when someone starts speaking French at you -- and expects you to answer them, no different than trying to learn how to drive a car would work from studying a book and without stepping into a car. You may be able to partly learn a language from studying a dictionary, more so by actually trying to read a book (and maybe flipping back and forth between the book and the dictionary.) But more so, if you want to learn a language, you need to actually 'drop yourself' in the centre of the country or the region where you want to learn the language. And start to pick it up just like any 2 year old kid would (although he or she would have a significant advantage over you in the infinite learning flexibility that kids have at that time of their lives which you or I no longer have. Plus the two year old would not have to 'unlearn' some of the different things that you and I would probably have to 'unlearn' in order to 'learn' a different language).
Sunday, October 08, 2006
15.4. What is An Idea?
An idea is a representation -- a 'map' of a 'territory'. (See Alfred Korzybski, 1933, Science and Sanity, or S.I. Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action, 1941.) Now this territory could/can be real or it could/can be false. We can differentiate between ideas that are supposed to represent real territories or 'existential phenomena' vs. ideas that are meant to be 'fanciful' for any of a variety of reasons, some more honorable than others. There is a significant difference between fanciful literary entertainment and manipulative, narcissistic deceit. Also, ideas may represent real or false processes, real or false relationships between things, real or false descriptions of things. The issue of 'truth' or 'realness' becomes important only when we wish to 'plan an epistemological trip using good knowledge' and therefore need a map that is a 'good representation of the territory it is supposed to existentially represent. (See Korzybski and/or Hayakawaka again.)
Thus, words are short forms for ideas or concepts which in turn are representations of 'pieces of real existential territory' -- assuming the idea is supposed to be 'real' or 'right' or 'truthful' or 'congruent' or 'structurally similar' with the actual existential territory it is supposed to represent'. Otherwise, the map is a bad idea or a fanciful idea or a manipulative, deceitful idea, or something that has no 'truth bearing with existential reality as it really is'.
Our ideas are maps of things or processes that either exist in the real world or do not exist, or bits of both, or may potentially exist in the future if we make them happen by building actual physical replicas of the type of architecture that we have already built in our minds...These types of ideas are called 'plans'.
Kant (Critique of Pure Reason) said that we cannot 'know' our objective world but he was only partly right. What he should have said is that we can nevrr know our 'objective world' perfectly. however, we can know it with different amounts of truth value and/or distortion depedning on how 'good' or 'bad' our 'cogitive or conceptual maps' are and these maps will always be at least somewhat biaseed in favor of our personal interests, wishes, and/or fears, or worded otherwise, our IPPs (individual philosophies and psychologies). That is why science and our legal court systems and news reporters are always looking for 'second, third, and sometimes more sources of independent empirical verification'. The more independent verifications we get of something being true, the more we are likely to give the assertions behind these verifications 'truth value' and/or 'truth credibiltiy'.
Kant, in saying what he did about our not being able to know our objective world -- not being able to know the 'real' world beyond our senses -- set epistemology on its ear, and epistemology has not quite fully recovered yet. The Knatian 'Copernican' revolution in epistemology was partly good for epistemology in that it made people pay more attention to their individual and cultural biases -- and while Kant went through epistemology like a fairly strong wind storm, Nietzshe later took over for where Kant left off, and went back through epistemology like a level 5 hurricane, demolishing everything in his path. Nietzsche was undoubtedly the finest deconstructionist in the history of Western philosophy -- and much of his deconstructionism was epistemologically important as he 'tore down false idols'. But still, epistemology was a wreck by the time he was through. Between Kant and Nietzsche, together they opened the door back up for 'ethical relativists, 'non-ethical narcissists' and/or modern day Sophists' (conceptual mercenaries who will tell you anything you want to hear and make it sound good and credible even if it is not true -- like our modern day lawyers -- for a fee.)
Epistemology needs to be re-established on a solid foundation again, even if it does need to be much more wary of 'sensory error, inferential error, and narcissistic bias' than it was before Kant and Nietzshe. Partly Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein I believed tried to do this...but then along comes Derrida and more deconstructionism...tied in hand in hand with Foucault and his study of the narcissisitc relationship between 'knowledge and power'. Again epistemology takes a nose dive. Since Descartes and Kant turned the study of epistemology inwards, epistemology has had a rather rough ride through much of the 19th, all of the 20th, and now the 21st century. Are we left with anything other than 'epistemological nihilism'?
Personally, I say that we need to learn the lessons of Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault but put back into perspective and the perspective I tend to emphasize is the one built by Alfred Korzybski and his followers -- General Semantics -- with perhaps some modifications -- for example, 'dialectical modifications' -- that I may make along the way. This is what I will call 'DGB Epistemology' -- which has connections to every other section that I write about in DGB Philosophy -- Psychology, Business and Economics, History, Law, Ethics, Politics, Religion, and so on. Let us call this our starting point then, both for DGB Philosophy and, in particular, for DGB Epistemology.
dgb, September 25th, 2006
Thus, words are short forms for ideas or concepts which in turn are representations of 'pieces of real existential territory' -- assuming the idea is supposed to be 'real' or 'right' or 'truthful' or 'congruent' or 'structurally similar' with the actual existential territory it is supposed to represent'. Otherwise, the map is a bad idea or a fanciful idea or a manipulative, deceitful idea, or something that has no 'truth bearing with existential reality as it really is'.
Our ideas are maps of things or processes that either exist in the real world or do not exist, or bits of both, or may potentially exist in the future if we make them happen by building actual physical replicas of the type of architecture that we have already built in our minds...These types of ideas are called 'plans'.
Kant (Critique of Pure Reason) said that we cannot 'know' our objective world but he was only partly right. What he should have said is that we can nevrr know our 'objective world' perfectly. however, we can know it with different amounts of truth value and/or distortion depedning on how 'good' or 'bad' our 'cogitive or conceptual maps' are and these maps will always be at least somewhat biaseed in favor of our personal interests, wishes, and/or fears, or worded otherwise, our IPPs (individual philosophies and psychologies). That is why science and our legal court systems and news reporters are always looking for 'second, third, and sometimes more sources of independent empirical verification'. The more independent verifications we get of something being true, the more we are likely to give the assertions behind these verifications 'truth value' and/or 'truth credibiltiy'.
Kant, in saying what he did about our not being able to know our objective world -- not being able to know the 'real' world beyond our senses -- set epistemology on its ear, and epistemology has not quite fully recovered yet. The Knatian 'Copernican' revolution in epistemology was partly good for epistemology in that it made people pay more attention to their individual and cultural biases -- and while Kant went through epistemology like a fairly strong wind storm, Nietzshe later took over for where Kant left off, and went back through epistemology like a level 5 hurricane, demolishing everything in his path. Nietzsche was undoubtedly the finest deconstructionist in the history of Western philosophy -- and much of his deconstructionism was epistemologically important as he 'tore down false idols'. But still, epistemology was a wreck by the time he was through. Between Kant and Nietzsche, together they opened the door back up for 'ethical relativists, 'non-ethical narcissists' and/or modern day Sophists' (conceptual mercenaries who will tell you anything you want to hear and make it sound good and credible even if it is not true -- like our modern day lawyers -- for a fee.)
Epistemology needs to be re-established on a solid foundation again, even if it does need to be much more wary of 'sensory error, inferential error, and narcissistic bias' than it was before Kant and Nietzshe. Partly Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein I believed tried to do this...but then along comes Derrida and more deconstructionism...tied in hand in hand with Foucault and his study of the narcissisitc relationship between 'knowledge and power'. Again epistemology takes a nose dive. Since Descartes and Kant turned the study of epistemology inwards, epistemology has had a rather rough ride through much of the 19th, all of the 20th, and now the 21st century. Are we left with anything other than 'epistemological nihilism'?
Personally, I say that we need to learn the lessons of Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault but put back into perspective and the perspective I tend to emphasize is the one built by Alfred Korzybski and his followers -- General Semantics -- with perhaps some modifications -- for example, 'dialectical modifications' -- that I may make along the way. This is what I will call 'DGB Epistemology' -- which has connections to every other section that I write about in DGB Philosophy -- Psychology, Business and Economics, History, Law, Ethics, Politics, Religion, and so on. Let us call this our starting point then, both for DGB Philosophy and, in particular, for DGB Epistemology.
dgb, September 25th, 2006
15.3. How Do We Determine A 'Good' Idea?
Here's how DGB Philosophy defines a good idea -- borrowing the ideas of 'clear' and 'distinct' from Descartes :
1. It needs to be 'associatively' clear. (the 'associative clarity' criterion. How is hte idea similar and/or related to other ideas?).
2. It needs to be 'distinctively' clear. (the 'distinctive clarity' criterion. How is the idea distinctively clear or clearly different than other ideas?).
3. It needs to be 'empirically' or 'experientially' grounded. (The 'empirical- experiential' and 'ontological' criterion. Does the idea represent a 'phenomenon' -- a person, thing, process, and/or event...that actually exists?)
4. It needs to be 'narcissistically useful'. (The 'narcissistic' criterion -- 'Does the idea help to make my life better).
5. It should be 'altruistically useful'. (The 'altruistic' criterion. Does the idea help to make the world a better place to live in?)
1. It needs to be 'associatively' clear. (the 'associative clarity' criterion. How is hte idea similar and/or related to other ideas?).
2. It needs to be 'distinctively' clear. (the 'distinctive clarity' criterion. How is the idea distinctively clear or clearly different than other ideas?).
3. It needs to be 'empirically' or 'experientially' grounded. (The 'empirical- experiential' and 'ontological' criterion. Does the idea represent a 'phenomenon' -- a person, thing, process, and/or event...that actually exists?)
4. It needs to be 'narcissistically useful'. (The 'narcissistic' criterion -- 'Does the idea help to make my life better).
5. It should be 'altruistically useful'. (The 'altruistic' criterion. Does the idea help to make the world a better place to live in?)
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