Epistemology is the study of knowledge which is essentially the study of, and search for, truth. What is 'truth' but knowledge that we trust as being highly reliable or in the language of the courts, 'beyond reasonable doubt'. Indeed, we hear the word -- and concept -- of 'truth' most often when we are talking about what comes out of the mouths of people -- does it have credibility, reliability, substance, and congruence, or does it not?
'Subjectivism' for the most part, rules people's hearts, rules people's attitudes, and rules people's behavior. Subjectivism is also the biggest reason for what we might call 'distortions' of truth, 'manipulations' of truth, 'embellishments' of truth, and/or 'suppressions' of truth. Thus, the search and the study of truth has to reach behind the 'smoke and mirrors' of human subjectivism and bias in order to get to what we might call that promised land, that holy land, of 'objective and untarnished truth'. That is an extremely formidable task as most men and women spend much of their living day putting up smoke and mirror displays of what they are only pretending to think, feel, do, and/or be. Often, we do this in the name of 'politeness', 'discreetness', 'diplomacy', 'political correctness' and/or we do it in order to diguise and/or defend against our real subjective beliefs, feelings, impulses, biases, motives, and/or behaviors.
In short, human narcissism colors and distorts the search and study of 'truth' and 'objective knowledge (epistemology)' in a thousand and one different ways.
It is in this regard that I would like to intoduce an assortment of new terms and/or ideas that are all connected to a particular perspective on the study of truth and/or epistemology that might be called respectively: 'dialectical truth' and/or 'dialectical epistemology'.
Firstly, there are two types of dialectical truth: 'either/or truth'; and/or 'integrative (bi-polar, subjective-objective) truth'. The same can be said for both 'knowledge' and 'epistemology' -- i.e. we can talk about 'either/or knowledge' and/or 'integrative knowledge'; and we can talk about 'either/or epistemology' and/or 'integrative, bi-polar, subjective-objective epistemology'.
Example: A divorced husband and wife are in court fighting over support of the kids, access, money, property, rights, privildges, etc. The lawyer of the husband gets up and paints a particular picture of what exactly happened to lead to the breakup of this husband and wife relationship. Then the lawyer of the wife gets up and paints a totally different picture.
The judge is left with the rather formidable question here: Where is the truth? What really happened here?
Does the judge reach an 'either/or' dialectical judgment? Or does he/she reach an 'integrative, mixed, bi-polar and bi-partisan judgement? Is the judgment skewed to one side or the other based on either 'either/or' epistemology and/or by 'either/or' ethical-legal discriminatory-preferential templates? In this latter regard, does the judge tend to be an 'either/or' judge and/or an 'integrative' judge? Does the judge base his/her judgment on sexual stereotypes, sexual discrimination, sexual preferentialism, legal templates which themselves may contain sexual sterotypes, discriminations, preferentialisms, and the like. Or is the judge looking for a 'balanced, integrative judgment'?
A partly artifical and arbitrary -- but partly not -- distinction can also be drawn between what might be called 'subjective epistemology' vs. 'objective epistemology' with the dialectically integrative epistemologists like myself aiming to 'split the difference' and/or 'bridge the gap' between 'subjective' and 'objective' epistemology.
Who were the great 'subjective epistemologists'? Off the top of my head, the list might read something like this: Anaxamander, Plato, Hobbes, Voltaire, Kant, Schopenhauer, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Foucualt...
Who were the great 'objective epistemologists'? Again off the top of my head, the list might read something like this: Aristotle, Bacon, Newton, Locke, Darwin, Diderot, Ayn Rand...
Who were the great bi-polar, epistemological integrationists? Heraclitus, the Han Philosophers, Hegel, Korzybski, Einstein, Hayakawa, Derrida, (hopefully and ideally myself someday...)...
Let's call it a day for our introduction to 'dialectical truth' and 'DGB Dialectical Epistemology'.
dgb, jan. 26th, 2008.
Sunday, January 20, 2008
Sunday, January 06, 2008
15.17. The Relationship Between Words, Ideas, and Phenomena
Words represent ideas, and ideas represent 'things' and 'processes' -- together of which we will call 'phenomena'.
There are different types of words: 1. 'action or process words' -- which we call 'verbs'; 2. 'object, structure, animal or people words' -- which we call 'nouns'; 3. 'description words' which includes 'descriptions of actions or processes' -- which we call 3a. 'adverbs'; and 'descriptions of objects, structures, minerals, plants, or animals including people -- which we call 3b. 'adjectives' or sometimes 3c. 'pronouns'; 4. 'relationship words' which include 4a. 'prepositions' (egs. 'up', 'in', 'out', 'under', 'over'), and 4b. 'conjunctions' (eg. 'and', 'or'); and 5. 'exclamation or emotion words' (eg. "heh!, 'Ughh!'). Those five categories are just about all the different categories of words wee have in the Enlgish language -- I don't think I've left any significant categories out even if there are many exceptions to the general rules, and even if my grammar names, categories, and rules are very rusty -- which they are.
Now my ideas on epistemology have been influenced by a number of different 'sets' of epistemologists -- let's call Aristotle and Locke one set of influences; Berkeley and Hume a second set of influences; Plato and Kant a third set of influences; Ruseell and Wittgenstein a fourth set of influences; Korzybski and Hayakawa a fifth set of influences; Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden a sixth set of influences; and Hegel a seventh influence. I would call the fifth, sixth, and seventh sets of influences the dominant influences in my epistemological viewpoint.
A distinction can be made between an 'associative or harmonious influence' on the one hand, and a 'differential, counter, anti, or competitive influence' on the other hand. For example, Plato and Kant have provided a differential, counter-influence for me whereas Korzybski and Hayakawa have provided an associative, harmonious influence for me. More on this as we go along.
This unique set of epistemological influences combined with the way that these influential forces have been combined in my unique, creative, editorial or screening machinery -- i.e., my brain -- has resulted in an approach to epistemology that is at least a little -- and I think significantly -- different than any other existing mainstrean and/or offstream approach to epistemology. Much of what I am arguing for is pragmatic and mainly common sense -- a la Aristotle and Locke, Russell and Wittgenstein, Korzysbki and Hayakawa, Rand and Branden -- while my two main epistemological adversaries are Plato and Kant. Berkely and Hume remain partial adversaries: Berkeley was too much of a 'perceptual and epistemological relativist' (as Nietzsche would become later in a partly different sense introducing the idea of 'narcissistic bias'); and Hume was a very intelligent skeptic who just went a little too far to the point of 'trashing common sense and epistemological pragmatism'.
My DGB perspective on epistemology can be viewed visually as an 'upside down triangle' with 'words' and 'ideas' represented by the upper two points on the triangle and 'phenomena' ('things' and 'processes') represented by the bottom point of the triangle. The bottom point of the triangle can be referred to as the 'grounded, emprical point' whereas the upper two points can be referred to as 'metaphysical points' (above and beyond physics in the form of symbols and conceptuology -- except for the fact that they stem from the human brain and human vocal chords, writing hands, and/or typing hands).
Again, words represent ideas which in turn are usually meant to represent 'real phenomena in the real world' -- but not always, due to such things as a vivid human imagination, fiction, mythology, errors, false perception, false beliefs, and narcissistic manipulation where there is a purposeful intent to socially deceive...
That word 'real' can be epistemologically troublesome just like the word 'objective' and the words 'truth' and 'fact'. Epistemology is full of human subjectivity even as it usually paradoxically strives for 'truth', 'objectivity', 'fact', and 'knowledge' that is not tainted or corrupted by narcissitic human bias. This is what led Nietzsche to write:
....................................................................
'There are no facts, only interpretations.'
Notebooks, (Summer 1886 – Fall 1887) (Wikipedia).
......................................................................
Nietzsche's point was overstated -- like most of his points -- but it was this overstatement that gave more impact and clout to what he said.
Here is an extrapolation of Nietzsche's point that I found overtop of the last Wikipedia link.
............................................................................
José Pablo Feinmann, in Part 6 of his ongoing history of Peronism which comes with Pagina/12 on Sundays and which I’d link to if it was on the website, says,
Ah, the truth! Yes, that’s quite a topic. He who believes himself to be in possession of it doesn’t know what it is. The truth isn’t. To establish the truth about something would be to kill it, reify it, give it a definitive sense among the infinite number which it undoubtedly possesses. On the 17th of October [1943] there were thousands of people on the streets and at the end of the day a colonel called Perón gave a speech to the multitude gathered in the Plaza de Mayo. Is that the truth? No, it’s a fact (hecho). The truth is not a fact. […] Nietzsche famously said “There are no facts only interpretations.” […]…that phrase is worth its weight in gold […] We all know, more or less what occurred on the 17th of October. We know the facts. But what interpretation do we give them? Thought is a struggle between interpretations. Truths collide. There are no innocent truths. Truths represent interests.
.................................................................................
I like that piece but it is the topic of another essay (or more) -- an essay on the influence of narcissistic bias and/or power on 'the corruption of truth claims'.
Words/concepts like 'truth' and 'fact' have value within a 'pragmatic, common-sense epistemology'. However, epistemologically credible and reliable 'truth claims' have to come from people who are sincerely looking for the 'unbiased, objective truth' and don't have a narcissistic stake in the outcome. Furthermore, they need to be good at finding this type of 'unbiased truth'. And even then, they can still be wrong. Epistemological skepticism -- as long as it is not taken to extreme -- is a good philosophical outlook to have. It is harder for people to manipulate you with truth claims that are distorted for purpose of narcissistic, personal benefit.
Let's move on to the subject of 'epistemological congruence and existence'.
dgb, jan. 6th, 2008.
There are different types of words: 1. 'action or process words' -- which we call 'verbs'; 2. 'object, structure, animal or people words' -- which we call 'nouns'; 3. 'description words' which includes 'descriptions of actions or processes' -- which we call 3a. 'adverbs'; and 'descriptions of objects, structures, minerals, plants, or animals including people -- which we call 3b. 'adjectives' or sometimes 3c. 'pronouns'; 4. 'relationship words' which include 4a. 'prepositions' (egs. 'up', 'in', 'out', 'under', 'over'), and 4b. 'conjunctions' (eg. 'and', 'or'); and 5. 'exclamation or emotion words' (eg. "heh!, 'Ughh!'). Those five categories are just about all the different categories of words wee have in the Enlgish language -- I don't think I've left any significant categories out even if there are many exceptions to the general rules, and even if my grammar names, categories, and rules are very rusty -- which they are.
Now my ideas on epistemology have been influenced by a number of different 'sets' of epistemologists -- let's call Aristotle and Locke one set of influences; Berkeley and Hume a second set of influences; Plato and Kant a third set of influences; Ruseell and Wittgenstein a fourth set of influences; Korzybski and Hayakawa a fifth set of influences; Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden a sixth set of influences; and Hegel a seventh influence. I would call the fifth, sixth, and seventh sets of influences the dominant influences in my epistemological viewpoint.
A distinction can be made between an 'associative or harmonious influence' on the one hand, and a 'differential, counter, anti, or competitive influence' on the other hand. For example, Plato and Kant have provided a differential, counter-influence for me whereas Korzybski and Hayakawa have provided an associative, harmonious influence for me. More on this as we go along.
This unique set of epistemological influences combined with the way that these influential forces have been combined in my unique, creative, editorial or screening machinery -- i.e., my brain -- has resulted in an approach to epistemology that is at least a little -- and I think significantly -- different than any other existing mainstrean and/or offstream approach to epistemology. Much of what I am arguing for is pragmatic and mainly common sense -- a la Aristotle and Locke, Russell and Wittgenstein, Korzysbki and Hayakawa, Rand and Branden -- while my two main epistemological adversaries are Plato and Kant. Berkely and Hume remain partial adversaries: Berkeley was too much of a 'perceptual and epistemological relativist' (as Nietzsche would become later in a partly different sense introducing the idea of 'narcissistic bias'); and Hume was a very intelligent skeptic who just went a little too far to the point of 'trashing common sense and epistemological pragmatism'.
My DGB perspective on epistemology can be viewed visually as an 'upside down triangle' with 'words' and 'ideas' represented by the upper two points on the triangle and 'phenomena' ('things' and 'processes') represented by the bottom point of the triangle. The bottom point of the triangle can be referred to as the 'grounded, emprical point' whereas the upper two points can be referred to as 'metaphysical points' (above and beyond physics in the form of symbols and conceptuology -- except for the fact that they stem from the human brain and human vocal chords, writing hands, and/or typing hands).
Again, words represent ideas which in turn are usually meant to represent 'real phenomena in the real world' -- but not always, due to such things as a vivid human imagination, fiction, mythology, errors, false perception, false beliefs, and narcissistic manipulation where there is a purposeful intent to socially deceive...
That word 'real' can be epistemologically troublesome just like the word 'objective' and the words 'truth' and 'fact'. Epistemology is full of human subjectivity even as it usually paradoxically strives for 'truth', 'objectivity', 'fact', and 'knowledge' that is not tainted or corrupted by narcissitic human bias. This is what led Nietzsche to write:
....................................................................
'There are no facts, only interpretations.'
Notebooks, (Summer 1886 – Fall 1887) (Wikipedia).
......................................................................
Nietzsche's point was overstated -- like most of his points -- but it was this overstatement that gave more impact and clout to what he said.
Here is an extrapolation of Nietzsche's point that I found overtop of the last Wikipedia link.
............................................................................
José Pablo Feinmann, in Part 6 of his ongoing history of Peronism which comes with Pagina/12 on Sundays and which I’d link to if it was on the website, says,
Ah, the truth! Yes, that’s quite a topic. He who believes himself to be in possession of it doesn’t know what it is. The truth isn’t. To establish the truth about something would be to kill it, reify it, give it a definitive sense among the infinite number which it undoubtedly possesses. On the 17th of October [1943] there were thousands of people on the streets and at the end of the day a colonel called Perón gave a speech to the multitude gathered in the Plaza de Mayo. Is that the truth? No, it’s a fact (hecho). The truth is not a fact. […] Nietzsche famously said “There are no facts only interpretations.” […]…that phrase is worth its weight in gold […] We all know, more or less what occurred on the 17th of October. We know the facts. But what interpretation do we give them? Thought is a struggle between interpretations. Truths collide. There are no innocent truths. Truths represent interests.
.................................................................................
I like that piece but it is the topic of another essay (or more) -- an essay on the influence of narcissistic bias and/or power on 'the corruption of truth claims'.
Words/concepts like 'truth' and 'fact' have value within a 'pragmatic, common-sense epistemology'. However, epistemologically credible and reliable 'truth claims' have to come from people who are sincerely looking for the 'unbiased, objective truth' and don't have a narcissistic stake in the outcome. Furthermore, they need to be good at finding this type of 'unbiased truth'. And even then, they can still be wrong. Epistemological skepticism -- as long as it is not taken to extreme -- is a good philosophical outlook to have. It is harder for people to manipulate you with truth claims that are distorted for purpose of narcissistic, personal benefit.
Let's move on to the subject of 'epistemological congruence and existence'.
dgb, jan. 6th, 2008.
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